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Abstract
We develop an economic and operational model to examine the conditions for the viable provision of content
distribution services by a monopolistic firm. Each user firm (the content provider or CP) has the option of
buying content distribution services from the content distribution service provider (CDP) or going on its own
to arrange for its content to be distributed at a set of chosen sites operated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
The CDP enjoys operational benefits in terms of both the fixed and variable cost of replicating content.
However, we find that for certain market situations (concentrated CP and ISP demand), not all CPs will find
it attractive to buy services from the CDP. The best case for the CDP is when the various content providers
have similar demand that is uniformly distributed across ISP sites.
Keywords:  Content distribution, content providers, pricing of services
Introduction
The widespread growth and availability of the Internet has made it possible to deploy many new applications that can be accessed
over a network. However, this unprecedented growth has a downside as well. As the traffic carried over the Internet increases,
the performance of network-based applications often becomes unpredictably slow. A variety of techniques are being considered
to improve the performance of networked applications including  better capacity planning, class differentiation and reservation,
and content distribution. This study is concerned with content distribution networks (CDN) as a technique to improve the
performance of networked applications. While content distribution techniques apply to any networked application, we focus here
on networked applications that, for the most part, use the public Internet as the means of connecting the various components
necessary to make the application function.
The main idea behind content distribution is avoid congested network paths from having to carry client-server communications.
This is achieved by providing a surrogate server site with which the client has better connectivity in terms of delay. Since a
surrogate server will typically have better connectivity with a relatively small fraction of the clients, several surrogates will have
to be provided to ensure acceptable performance for all client locations. Often content distribution services are obtained through
a CDN provider, a firm that has special arrangements with numerous Internet Service Providers (ISPs) where surrogate servers
may be located. Alternative distribution systems include peer-to-peer file sharing systems such as the Gnutella project
(http://gnutella.wego.com; Kan 2001) and Kazaa (www.kazaa.com). Freenet (http://freenet.sourceforge.net) is a peer-to-peer
file-storage system where the users can place their files on other nodes’ storage spaces (Clarke et al. 2002; Langley 2001).
However, large commercial content providers currently do not utilize peer-to-peer networking with other content providers for
variety of reasons including competition and security. 
The goal of this paper is to derive an economic and operational model to evaluate two options a firm may have to distribute its
content:  (1) by obtaining the services of CDN provider, and (2) by directly forming arrangements with the ISPs. We will hereafter
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refer to the firm that seeks to distribute its content as the content provider (CP), and the content distribution network provider as
CDP. Current players in the content distribution market include U.S.-based companies Akamai (www.akamai.com) and Speedera
(www.speedera.com), UK-based Cable and Wireless (www.cw.com), and Accelia (www.accelia.net) from Japan. CDPs act as
intermediaries between content providers and ISPs. Intermediary services have been studied in the context of electronic
marketplaces, where intermediaries are shown to enjoy aggregation benefits (Bhargava et al. 2000). Our model also considers
benefits similar to aggregation that the CDP enjoys. However, we develop these benefits from an operational economy that the
CDP derives, rather than benefits that accrue from aggregation of information. 
Our work is related to studies on network pricing, information intermediary services, and allocation and pricing models of content
delivery services. Existing studies on network pricing include pricing of congestible network resources such as an FTP server
where pricing is used to ensure efficient use of these resources (MacKie-Mason and Varian 1995), priority-based pricing (Gupta
et al. 1996; Mendelson and Whang 1990), optimal pricing of integrated services networks with a guaranteed quality of service
(Wang et al. 1996), and a simulation of pricing policies in multiple service class networks (Cocchi et al. 1993). Corbett and
Karmarkar (1999) provide an equilibrium pricing model for an information intermediary. Besides these pricing models, the
Thomas et al. (2002) model develops an approach to allocate network resources optimally. In terms of pricing of content delivery
systems, earlier research focuses on how content providers set the price they charge to end users. Jagannathan and Almeroth
(2001) propose a probabilistic adaptive flat-fee pricing scheme for content delivery services based on user behavior. An extension
to this study compares fixed and variable pricing schemes for delivering batched content such as video-on-demand and
downloadable-CD. (Jagannathan et al. 2002). While prior research separately deals with pricing and resource allocation, our model
jointly makes decisions on these two issues. 
The content provider’s objective is to ensure that many users see its content with acceptable delay. Often, ISPs cache some
content, helping the content provider deliver its content closer to the users that demand the content. Hosanagar et al. (2002)
develop a model for resource allocation and pricing for different levels of caching in ISP networks. A price-driven market-based
resource allocation model for content delivery is studied by Ercetin (2002) using a noncooperative game theoretic approach among
the content providers and surrogate servers.
At this stage of this research, we have been able to formulate a simple model and derive some qualitative results. These deal
mainly with the link between the pattern of user demand for content and the viability of CDN service provision. Our main
conclusion is that CDN services make sense when the CP side of the market is fragmented (no one CP dominates in terms of
demand) and the user side of the market is also fragmented (no particular user location or ISP site dominates in terms of demand).
As the demand structure moves away from the above, the CDP’s position in the market weakens.
The Model
The model attempts to describe the market conditions that are viable for content delivery providers. CDPs offer content
distribution services to content providers with a guaranteed level of service, measured in terms of average end-user delay. They
accomplish this by putting surrogate servers within ISP locations. When a CDP puts content at an ISP location, the requests
originating from that location do not have to travel on the public Internet. Hence users experience less delay. In addition, from
the perspective of the ISP, there are benefits as well since the ISP can save a significant portion of the upstream bandwidth
requirement. Achieving delivery of content this way is different from the caching done by ISPs. Typically, caching at an ISP is
done from the perspective of the ISP, so only content that is in heavy demand is cached by the ISP. Second, while ISPs can cache
some content on their own, a CDP replicates both content and applications on surrogate (or edge) servers at ISP sites.
The model envisions a monopolistic scenario with a single CDP serving many content providers (see Figure 1). There are n
content providers (denoted by CP1, CP2, …, CPn) and m ISPs (denoted by ISP1, ISP2, …, ISPm) in the market. Each content
provider is assumed to have a combination of static content, dynamic content, and applications that cater to end users in different
geographical regions that access this content via ISPs. Note that an individual ISP in Figure 1 represents the site of an ISP rather
than the entire ISP firm. Thus a combination of sites can be owned by the same ISP firm (such as America Online).
The key structure of our model is as follows. Content providers need an average delay guarantee and attractive price from the CDP
in order to join to the CDN service. If the sum of the cost of the guaranteed delay and the CDP’s price does not meet a content
provider’s threshold cost, the content provider should directly make arrangements with individual ISPs to locate surrogate servers
at one or more ISP sites. The selection of ISP sites by a content provider will depend on the demand for the CP’s content at
specific sites. The aforementioned threshold cost is based on this selection and is used as a benchmark in the content provider’s
decision of whether or not to buy services from the CDP.    
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Figure 1.  Architecture of a Content Delivery Network
The CDP distributes content at a number of ISP sites that are again selected based on the demand for content across the
participating CPs. However, the CDP has two operational benefits. The first benefit is the fixed cost of opening a new ISP site.
The CDP pays a fixed cost for the first time a surrogate server is placed at a new ISP site. After an ISP site has been opened, there
is only an incremental cost for adding new content. This incremental cost is the cost of keeping the content current. Here too, the
CDP enjoys scale economies.
The mechanism works as follows. First, each CP solves a cost minimization problem to decide on the subset of ISP sites at which
the content will be replicated. The CDP’s solution will have to beat the CP’s solution, otherwise the CP will not buy CDN services
and will choose to directly deal with the ISPs. The CDP will obtain its profit maximizing solution by considering all the CPs and
offer CDN services to each CP at a price and an average delay guarantee.
CP’s Problem
Let D denote the demand matrix where dij represents the demand for the content provider i (CPi) at jth ISP (ISPj). Let L denote the
expected delay matrix of delays among different ISPs where Lij represents the amount of delay between ith and jth ISPs (ISPi and
ISPj). Given these two matrices, ith content provider (CPi) solves a cost minimization problem that is described below.
The objective is to minimize the sum of delay cost and fixed and variable cost of replication by choosing a set of sites at which
to replicate the content (xijs). For any given set of assignments to the xkj variables, the average delay for a CP is calculated as
follows. The delay is zero for a demand at an ISP that carries the content. At an ISP site that does carry the CP’s content, the delay
is calculated by obtaining the content from the ISP site that has the least inter-ISP delay.  The CP’s problem is formally expressed
below.
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The content provider’s decision variables ( ) take binary values as follows:ijx
1, replicates its content on 's network,
0, Otherwise.
i j
ij
CP ISP
x

= 
The solution of this problem will give CPi an optimal cost-delay pair ( , *i). The fixed cost parameter F represents the costiCPTC
of placing the content at any ISP location. The replication cost R is modeled as a concave function of the total number of
replications. As this number increases, the replication cost increases at a decreasing rate. This is because of economies in
propagating updates to surrogate sites that are relatively close to one another. Previous studies have shown that delay costs (C(*))
are often nonlinear (Ercetin 2002). Note that, in the content provider’s problem, demand is expressed as data demanded per period.
Similarly, all of the costs are operating costs that are expressed as dollar amounts per period. 
CDP’s Problem
CDPs typically price content providers that join to their network according to a two-part tariff scheme that includes a fixed charge
plus a usage fee based on the amount of traffic users of that CP generate on the surrogate servers. The CDP also provides the CP
with an average delay guarantee.  The CDP must determine the price pi it will charge to each content provider given
by , where " is the flat portion of the price and $ is price per Mbps of user demand for the CP’s content at∑
=
+=
m
j
iji dp
1
βα
an ISP. The delay guarantee for a given CP can be calculated using the CDP’s replication variables for that CP and the delays that
would be incurred at each ISP site that does not carry the content.
The objective of the CDP is to maximize profit. The total revenue (TR) is the sum of the revenue collected from each CP that buys
its content distribution services. The total cost (TC) is the total fixed cost of content distribution (one fixed cost per ISP site that
is used for replication) plus the total replication cost that arises from the need to keep the content current. Note that the CDP can
be expected to enjoy greater geographical economies than the CP since there will be more content replication (across CPs) in the
CDP’s solution. The CDP must choose the price variables (" and $) the replication variables (yij), and the participation variables
(qi) to maximize profit. The CDP solves the following problem. 
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Where, and  is the indicator function that calculated as
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The CDN provider’s decision variables (  and qi) take binary values as follows: ijy
1, Content of  content provider is replicated on 's network
0, Otherwise,
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j
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1, if  joins the CDP's network,
0, Otherwise.
i
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q

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Then for each content provider CPi, the CDP will have the total expected delay for its content, * (yij).
As in the case of the CP, F represents the fixed cost of opening a new ISP site for the CDP. Here, the CDP benefits from scale
economies since in the CDP’s solution, content from different CP’s can be located at the same ISP site. Note that this fixed cost
economy does not apply to the CP since the same content will never be duplicated at the given ISP location. Furthermore the cost
of keeping the updates current will also be less for the CDP (on a per content basis) because of geographical economies. Similar
to the content provider’s problem, all costs and demand for content are expressed as per period quantities. After solving its
problem, the CDN provider will offer content distribution services to each CP at a given price and delay guarantee (pi, *i) that
will allow each content provider to decide whether or not to buy CDN services.
Solution Procedure
The preceding two problems are hard problems (NP-complete) (Bussieck and Pruessner 2003). The content provider’s problem
is a nonlinear integer programming (INLP) problem whereas the CDP’s problem is a Mixed Nonlinear Integer Programming
(MINLP) problem. For large values of m and n, these two problems are computationally expensive to solve. In the content delivery
market there are approximately 7 million content providers (200,000 of them being commercial content providers) and thousands
of ISP sites (Eisenmann 2002); therefore, a CDP’s problem can possibly have millions of decision variables. Of course, firms can
use preprocessing to eliminate certain content providers and ISP sites. Nevertheless solving the two problems will not be trivial.
Work is underway to find better solution techniques (Bussieck and Pruessner 2003).
Example
To shed light on the inner dynamics of the model, consider a small example with eight content providers (n = 8) and four ISPs
(m = 4).  To ensure tractability, simple but representative expressions are used for the delay cost and the replication cost functions.
For the delay cost function  is used where c is a delay cost parameter. For the replication cost2( )i iC cδ δ=
is used where g is a replication cost parameter and r is the number of replications, given by for
1( ) 1
1
R r g
r
 
= − 
+  1
m
ij
j
r x
=
=∑
the ith content provider. We have set c = g =1 for simplicity, in this version of the paper. 
Kaya et al./Content Distribution Services
2003 — Twenty-Fourth International Conference on Information Systems 831
The expected delay (per MB) matrix  is designed to incorporate two different types of ISPs: small
2 4 4
2 4 4
4 4 8
4 4 8
M
M
M
M
   
=     
L
and large. The first two ISPs are large and the connectivity between the two is very good, leading to low expected delay.  The
third and fourth ISPs are small so the connectivity between the two is poor. Additionally the expected delay from the two large
ISPs to the two small ones is better than the connectivity between the small ones but worse than the connectivity between the two
large ones. To facilitate the use of L in calculation of average delays and allow the use of Min(C) function, the diagonal values
are set to M, which is a sufficiently large number.  Four cases, based on different demand characteristics (see Table 1), are
described and implications for the content providers and the CDN provider are discussed. 
Table 1.  Demand Structure
Uniform ISP Demand Concentrated ISP Demand
Uniform
CP Demand Case 1 Case 4
Concentrated
CP Demand Case 2 Case 3
Case 1
8 8
8 8
  =   
D
K
M O M
L
In this case, the demand for content is uniformly distributed among n content providers. Furthermore, each content provider’s
demand is also uniformly distributed across the m ISPs.  Because of this uniformity, content providers behave similarly; therefore,
the decision is simple for both the CDP and the content providers. The decision for content providers is based on the values of
the fixed cost parameter F and the delay cost parameter c. For a sufficiently small value of F (large c) content providers should
place their content at all of the ISPs. As F increases (c decreases) ,the decision to place content at all ISPs will change to
placement at a subset of ISPs. Finally for a sufficiently high large F (small c), the content will be placed at a single ISP. Note that
the content has to be placed with at least one ISP to avoid infinitely large delays. This (single) ISP can be thought of as the content
provider’s origin site. For the CDN provider, the decision is also quite straightforward. The price parameters (" and $) can be
chosen so as to attract all content providers to the CDN by offering them a slightly cheaper alternative. This case is the best one
for the CDP.
Case 2
32 32 32 32
32 32 32 32
32 32 32 32
32 32 32 32
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
8 8 8 8
    
=      
D
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The demand matrix for this case is shown above. In one aspect,this case is quite similar to case 1.  The similarity stems from the
resulting average delay. Note that as long as the distribution of the demand for two content providers is uniform across the ISPs,
the average delay will be the same for these content providers. However, in another aspect, case 2 is quite different from case 1.
In case 2, the CDP has less flexibility in the pricing decision; hence there is loss of market power. The tradeoff between the two
price parameters (" and $) causes the relative lack of power. If the CDP sets a high value for " and a low value for $, small content
providers are penalized and these providers may not join the network. Alternatively, if the CDN provider sets a low value for "
and a high value for $, large content providers are penalized and these providers may not join the network. In either case, the CDP
loses a certain portion of its profits.
Case 3
Case 3 depicts a demand pattern that is concentrated at certain ISPs and also concentrated toward certain content providers. In
this case, the optimal solution to the content providers’ problem shows that for sufficiently high F values, content providers with
concentrated demand will have less incentive to join to the CDN.  The CDP, however, is able to attract content providers with
unconcentrated demand. For small values of F, the CDN provider can attract all content providers to join the CDN network.   
Case 4 
32 32 8 8
32 32 8 8
32 32 8 8
32 32 8 8
32 32 8 8
32 32 8 8
32 32 8 8
32 32 8 8
    
=      
D
This case is the opposite of case 2 with a demand pattern that is concentrated at certain ISPs but uniform across the content
providers. For very small F values, content providers should replicate content on all of  the ISPs.  As F increases, content
providers should favor ISPs with large demand. Depending on the value of F, the CDN can attract content providers to join the
network by adjusting the price parameters(" and $).  Similar to case 2, the CDP’s market power is less in comparison to the
uniform-uniform case. The loss of power occurs because content providers can focus their content on those ISPs that have large
demand for the content. This is a relatively low  cost solution that the CDP may find difficult to beat.
Limitations and Future Work
Our model is limited in that it assumes that an ISP can handle any amount of content that is put on its servers, i.e., ISP capacity
is not an issue. Even though the capacity in terms of storage may not be a serious issue for many ISPs, capacity in terms of
bandwidth should be considered.  This issue is currently being addressed in an extended model. Another limitation of the model
has to do with the assumption of deterministic demand that does not change with delay. This can be incorporated in the model
by letting demand matrix D depend on the delay.  The issue of linking demand with delay has broader implications as well. There
is no explicit modeling of user behavior or ISP behavior in the current model. In reality, an ISP also benefits if delays are reduced
and may therefore agree to subsidize certain CDP (or large CPs) in return for interesting or popular content. We believe that CDPs
will exert greater power in such situations since they act as aggregators of content. This issue currently is being addressed to
develop a more complete model of the players in the content distribution chain and their incentives. This chain consists of CPs
(who want many end users to access their content), CDPs (who exploit scale economies of distribution and content aggregation),
ISPs (who strive to reduce user delay while keeping their network and storage costs under control), and end users (who pay a price
for ISP services and have a disutility for access delay).
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